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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY: CAN IT SAVE THE FAMILY FARM?
[ohnson v. First National Bank, 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1015 (1984)].
INTRODUCTION

The threat of property loss due to mortgage foreclosure has
reached a state of emergency for farmers.' The ailing farm economy
is the major cause for the soaring default rate among Minnesota
farmers.2 The early 1980's brought many changes in the economy
adversely affecting the medium-sized, family-operated farm: a
stronger United States dollar, improvement of foreign agricultural
production, increased competition in international agricultural markets, decreased demand from underdeveloped countries for United
States farm products, devalued farmland, tripled inflation-adjusted
interest rates, sharply reduced agriculture-related tax shelters, and
reduced federal farm subsidies.3
1. In enacting the moratorium on mortgage foreclosure, the Minnesota Legislature found that
the number of unemployed persons in this state has reached the highest
level since the Depression of the 1930's; that farm commodity prices are
below the break-even point for the cost of production; that the number of
mortgage loans currently in default due to the unemployment of the principal wage earner has reached critical levels; and that by reason of these conditions and the high rates of interest on mortgage loans, many of the
citizens of this state will be unable for extended periods of time, to meet
payments of taxes, interest, and principal of mortgages on their properties
and are, therefore, threatened with loss of their real property through mortgage foreclosure, contract termination, and judicial sales. The legislature
further finds that these conditions have resulted in an emergency of a nature
that justifies and validates legislation for the extension of the time prior to
foreclosure and execution sales and for other relief.
Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, § 4, 1983 Minn. Laws 654, 655 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 583.01 (1984)).
2. Shilling, Economic Realities Demand the Demise of the "Family Farm, "Minneapolis
Star & Trib., Feb. 26, 1985, at 9A, col. 1.
3. Id. Falling land values decrease farmers' equity in their farmland. The resulting loss of bargaining power coupled with rising interest rates makes it difficult
for farmers to obtain loans for current operating expenses such as seed, fertilizer,
and fuel, or for refinancing farm mortgages. Furthermore, the reduction in agriculture-related tax shelters and subsidies makes turning a profit increasingly difficult for
farmers. Id
For a more in-depth analysis of the causes of the current farm crisis, see EcoNoMIc RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CONDITION OF FARMERS AND FARM LENDERS 1-5 (1985) (causes include growth in foreign
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The Minnesota Legislature has passed several laws to assist farmers in weathering the current farm economy crisis.4 The Family
Farm Security Program, 5 for example, helps qualified farmers obtain
credit for acquiring farmland by guaranteeing repayment of ninety
percent of their loans.6 This program is aimed, however, at
creditworthy farmers who want to expand, 7 not farmers who face losing their farms through foreclosure.
Minnesota's moratorium on mortgage foreclosures8 directly aids
farmers threatened with foreclosure by authorizing the district court
to postpone the foreclosure sale for up to twelve months.9 The statutory redemption period must be correspondingly reduced in order
to postpone the foreclosure sale.1o Consequently, many farmers find
the relief provided by the moratorium inadequate."1
The relief offered by the Minnesota Legislature fails to aid farmers
whose mortgages have already been foreclosed. Thus, farmers who
cannot redeem their foreclosed property prior to the expiration of
demand, accelerating inflation, low real interest rates in the 1970's, and reversing
trends in the 1980's).
4. See, e.g., Minnesota Emergency Farm Operating Loan Act, ch. 4, 1985 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 10 (West); Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 474, 1984 Minn. Laws 430 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 47.20, subd. 15, 559.21, subd. 6, 580.031, 583.01-.12 (1984))
(mortgage foreclosure moratorium); Family Farm Security Act, ch. 210, 1976 Minn.
Laws 689 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 41.51-.61, 48.24, subd. 5, 290.01, subd. 20
(1984)).
Under the Minnesota Emergency Farm Operating Loan Act, ch. 4, 1985 Minn.
Sess. Law Serv. 10 (West), the state will pay qualified lenders a percentage of the
interest on the first $25,000 of a farmer's existing operating loans and on the first
$25,000 of a farmer's existing farm ownership loan. Id. § 5. The state will also pay a
portion of the interest on the first $75,000 of a farmer's new operating loan. Id. § 6.
The Act expires on July 1, 1986. Id. § 11.
5. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, ch. 210, 1976 Minn. Laws 689 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 41.51-.61, 48.24, subd. 5, 290.01, subd. 20 (1984)).

6.

MINN. STAT.

§§ 41.51, 41.52, subd. 9, 41.56.

7. A family farm security loan "shall be used for acquisition of farm land.
Id. § 41.52, subd. 5.
8. Act of Apr. 25, 1984, ch. 474, 1984 Minn. Laws 430 (originally enacted as Act
of May 23, 1983, ch. 215, 1983 Minn. Laws 654; presently codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 47.20, subd. 15, 559.21, subd. 6, 580.031, 583.01-.12 (1984)).
9. MINN. STAT. § 583.04-.05.
10. Id. § 583.07. The statutory redemption period, however, cannot be less than
30 days. Id. Thus, a farmer would obtain a net gain of 30 days relief under the
moratorium if the court postponed the sale for 12 months.
11. Accord Amundson & Rotman, DepressionJurisprudenceRevisited: Minnesota's Moratorium on Mortgage Foreclosure, 10 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 805, 849 (1984) (30-day
grace period is too short and exposes mortgagor to deficiency judgment; mortgagor
is not provided with a "fresh start"). Apparently the current moratorium, which expires on July 1, 1985, will not be extended this legislative session. See Act of Apr. 25,
1984, ch. 474, § 16, 1984 Minn. Laws 430, 433 (expiration date); Coffman, Farm Moratorium Issue Appears Dead, St. Paul Pioneer Press & Dispatch, Apr. 10, 1985, at ID, col.
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their statutory redemption periodl2 have turned to the federal bankruptcy courts for help. Bankruptcy courts have traditionally responded by granting extensions.13 Nevertheless, the recent Eighth
Circuit decision in Johnson v. First National Bank 14 severely limits the
ability of federal bankruptcy courts to extend the redemption period
for bankrupt farmers and other debtors. Under Johnson, filing for
bankruptcy extends the redemption period by only sixty days. 15 A
farmer who has been unsuccessful in locating alternative financing
during the maximum twelve-month statutory redemption period will
generally need more than sixty days to secure a loan for redemption.
Moreover, depending on when a farmer files for bankruptcy, the statutory redemption period may not be extended at all. 16
This Comment focuses on the interplay between Minnesota foreclosure law and federal bankruptcy law. After reviewing the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Johnson, the author asserts that
the Johnson court erroneously disregarded the persuasive authority
supplied by statute and case law which grants federal bankruptcy
courts the power to adequately extend farmers' redemption periods.
The author concludes that a more liberal extension is consistent with
the policies of bankruptcy law and would equitably balance the interests of bankrupt farmers and their creditors.
I.

THE JOHNSON DECISION

In 1978, Curtis and Gloria Johnson, the principal officers and
shareholders of Oak Farms, Inc., executed a mortgage on their Minnesota farm property to secure a $300,000 note from First National
Bank of Montevideo.t7 The following year the Johnsons' a executed
a second mortgage 19 on their property to secure an additional
$650,000 from First National.20 In September of 1980, theJohnsons
and their corporation defaulted.21
Pursuant to its rights,22 First National executed a public sale of the
12. MINN. STAT. § 580.23; see infra note 49.
13. See infra notes 88-92, 130-32 and accompanying text.
14. 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1015 (1984).
15. See id. at 278; infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 54.
17. Johnson, 719 F.2d at 272.
18. The second mortgage was executed by theJohnsons, Oak Farms Service Co.,
and Oak Farms, Inc. Id. The Johnsons were also the principal officers and shareholders of Oak Farms Service Co. Id.
19. Id. Both mortgages contained a standard clause which granted the creditor
the right to execute a foreclosure sale by advertisement pursuant to Minnesota statute. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 580.01.

20. 719 F.2d at 272.
21. Id.
22. Under Minnesota law, a creditor may foreclose by advertisement upon the
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property to satisfy the debt.23 First National purchased 24 the property at the auction for $566,355.34.25 Consequently, the bank acquired an interest in the property subject to the Johnsons' right to
redeem within one year. 2 6
The Johnsons did not exercise their right to redeem. 2 7 Three
weeks before the redemption period expired, however, they filed a
petition28 for reorganization29 in bankruptcy, as well as an adversary
complaint seeking an order to stay the redemption period.30
default of a debtor if the mortgage provides for power of sale. MINN. STAT. § 580.01.30; see infra note 43 and accompanying text (regarding foreclosure by
advertisement).
23. 719 F.2d at 272.
24. According to the statute, "The mortgagee ... may fairly and in good faith
purchase the premises so advertised, or any part thereof, at such sale." MINN. STAT.
§ 580.11. A purchase for less than fair market value is not generally considered bad
faith. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cocks, 37 Minn. 530, 532, 35 N.W. 436, 437 (1887) ("mere
inadequacy of price is not of itself ground for setting aside a sale"). Dividing a parcel
into two lots to depress the price at the auction can, however, constitute bad faith.
Lalor v. McCarthy, 24 Minn. 417, 419-20 (1878).
25. 719 F.2d at 272. This price was "equivalent to the entire principal and interest on the secured indebtedness, together with the fees and expenses of sale allowed
by statute." Appellant's Brief at 3, Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1015 (1984). At the bankruptcy court hearing in October 1981,
Curtis Johnson testified that the fair market value of the mortgaged property was
actually $2,720,000 and that the encumbrances on the property totalled $2,043,000.
719 F.2d at 272. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor had substantial equity
in the property. Id.
26. See 719 F.2d at 272; see also MINN. STAT. § 580.23, subd. 2.
27. 719 F.2d at 272. The redemption period expired on or about October 31,
1981, since the property exceeded ten acres. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 580.23,
subd. 2(c). The right of theJohinsons' creditors to redeem the property had not yet
ripened because the statutory period had not expired. See id. § 580.24. For a description of creditors' rights to redeem, see infra note 49.
28. An individual debtor and his or her spouse may commence a joint bankruptcy case by filing a single petition with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 302
(1982).
29. Title 11 of the United States Code, commonly referred to as chapter 11, outlines the procedure applicable to an individual or corporation seeking reorganization. Id. §§ 1101-1112. In a chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor submits a
reorganization plan to the court. Id. §§ 1121-1123. The plan may be confirmed by
the court following a hearing. Id. §§ 1128-1129. In certain circumstances, the plan
may be confirmed over the objections of entire classes of creditors. Id. § 1129(b).
For a description of this procedure, see Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram
Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979). A confirmed plan
binds the debtor, all creditors, equity security holders, general partners of the
debtor, and any entities issuing security or acquiring property under the plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1141(a). A confirmed plan may discharge the debtor from certain thenexisting debts. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A)..
30. 719 F.2d at 272. The Johnsons alleged that they were entitled to the stay
because they had substantial equity in the mortgaged property. Id. Based upon the
Johnsons' testimony at the bankruptcy hearing, the debtor's equity was approximately $677,000. Id.; see supra note 25.
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The bankruptcy court found that an exigency existed and that the
Johnsons had substantial equity in the property.Sl Based on these
findings, the court enjoined First National from proceeding further
with the foreclosures2 and ordered that the expiration of the redemption period be stayed until further order or until the bankruptcy case was closed.33
The district court affirmed the stay of the redemption period expiration as ordered by the bankruptcy court.3 4 First National appealed
the district court's decision.S5 The Eighth Circuit addressed the
question of whether a federal bankruptcy court may interfere with
property rights established under state law.36 Relying on Butner v.
United States,3 7 the circuit court held that, absent a congressional
command or an important federal interest, property rights are governed by state law.3 8 Finding neither a congressional command nor
an important federal interest, the circuit court reversed the district
court and held that section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code does not
authorize the bankruptcy court to extend Minnesota's statutory redemption period.3 9 Because the circuit court could have alternatively affirmed the district court's decision on the basis of the
authority of section 36240 or section 10841 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the court also considered and rejected the applicability of both
31. 719 F.2d at 272-74. The Honorable John J. Connelly, United States BankruptcyJudge for the District of Minnesota, presided at the bankruptcy hearing. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 Bankr. 651, 652 n.l (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982). The
bankruptcy court did not discuss what constituted an exigency. See Johnson v. First
Nat'l Bank (In re Johnson), No. 3-81-1922, Adv. Proc. No. 81-0329, slip op. at 2
(Bankr. D. Minn. Oct. 20, 1981) (order enjoining expiration of redemption period),
reprintedin Appellant's Petition for Writ at A55. The Eighth Circuit interpreted exigency, as used by the bankruptcy court, to mean the debtor's urgent need for court
intervention to extend the redemption period. 719 F.2d at 274.
32. Although the creditor had already bought the property at the foreclosure
sale, the creditor's title to the property was subject to the debtor's right of redemption. MINN. STAT. § 580.12; see infra note 45 and accompanying text. The title will
pass to the purchaser without any further act on the purchaser's part. See In re Klein,
9 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D. Minn. 1934). Thus, it is arguable that there is nothing to be
enjoined. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
33. 719 F.2d at 272. For authority, the bankruptcy court relied upon the broad
equitable powers provided by 11 U.S.C. § 105. Id.
34. 19 Bankr. at 654. The Honorable Diana E. Murphy, of the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota, presided. Id. at 651.
35. 719 F.2d at 272.
36. Id.
37. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). For a discussion of Butner, see infra notes 140-45 and
accompanying text.
38. 719 F.2d at 274.
39. Id. at 274-75; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
41. See id. § 108(b).
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provisions 42
II.

APPLICABLE STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

A.

Minnesota Foreclosure Law

Under Minnesota law, a mortgagee can initiate foreclosure by advertisement or court action.43 Under either method, the mortgagee
who purchases at the foreclosure sale44 acquires a vested property
interest subject to the mortgagor's statutory right of redemption.45
The sale also discharges the foreclosed mortgage to the extent of the
bid.46 Any surplus from the sale in excess of the foreclosed mortgage amount must first be used to satisfy the claims of junior lienors. 4 7 The mortgagor can redeem the property by paying the
purchaser the sale price plus interest accrued prior to the redemption period's expiration.48 If the mortgagor fails to redeem the
42. 719 F.2d at 275-78. The Johnson court stated that a complete disposition of
the case requires a determination of whether the district court's decision could be
sustained on grounds other than those relied on by the district court. Id. (citing
Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept., 691 .F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 908 (1983); Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 227 (8th Cir.
1976)). For a discussion of the grounds for rejection, see infra text accompanying
notes 65-136.
43. MINN. STAT. chs. 580-582 (1984). Foreclosure by advertisement, id.
§ 580.01-.30, is generally preferred over judicial foreclosure, id. § 581.01-.12, because it is more expeditious and less expensive. Foreclosure by advertisement, however, has been subjected to constitutional challenge. See, e.g., F. & H. Inv. Co. v.
Sackman-Gilliland Corp., 305 Minn. 155, 232 N.W.2d 769 (1975).
44. Prior to the sale, the mortgagor or any junior creditor may reinstate the
mortgage by paying the mortgagee the amount in default at commencement of the
foreclosure proceeding, plus interest and other expenses incidental to the foreclosure proceeding. MINN. STAT. § 580.30. The foreclosure proceeding is then abandoned. Id. By this procedure, the mortgagor or junior creditor exercises his or her
equity of redemption. This procedure is unlike the statutory right of redemption,
which ripens after the foreclosure sale. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1 (1979).
45. MINN. STAT. § 580.12; see also In re Klein, 9 F. Supp. at 60 ("mortgage deed
.passes a defeasible title whichis perfected by foreclosure"). In addition to the
mortgagor, creditors may also redeem. See infra note 49 (discussing creditors' right
to redeem).
46. See MINN. STAT. §§ 580.09-•10, 581.06. If the applicable redemption period
is six months, a mortgagee who purchases at the sale forfeits his or her right to a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor. Id. § 580.23, subd. 1; see also American
Nat'l Bank v. Blaeser, 326 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 1982) (mortgagee may not elect 12month redemption period over applicable 6-month period in order to retain right to
deficiency judgment).
47. MINN. STAT. § 580.09; see alo id. § 580.10 (any surplus left over after junior
lienors are satisfied must be paid to mortgagor).
48. Id. §§ 580.23, 581.10. Any taxes or insurance premiums paid by the purchaser are included in the redemption price. Id. § 580.09. The interest rate charged
is that specified in the mortgage for this purpose up to eight percent or, if none is
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property, 4 9 passage of time completes the conveyance without further action by the purchaser.50 Absent fraud during the foreclosure
sale, state courts cannot intervene in the process set in motion by the
foreclosure sale. 5 '
B.

FederalBankruptcy Law

Although state courts cannot alter the rights of the parties after
the foreclosure sale, federal courts are not powerless to intervene.
Federal bankruptcy courts have three potential sources of statutory
authority for altering parties' rights by extending the mortgagor's
redemption period. These sources are sections 108, 362, and 105 of
the Bankruptcy Code.52
specified, six percent. Id. § 581.10. The redemption period is generally six months.
Id. § 580.23, subd. 1. A 12-month redemption period is provided if the mortgaged
property as of the date of the mortgage exceeded 10 acres. Id. § 580.23, subd. 2. A
12-month redemption period is also provided if the mortgage was executed before
July 1, 1967, or if the amount claimed to be due on the date of notice of the foreclosure sale is less than two-thirds of the original principal secured by the mortgage. Id.
49. Section 580.24 allows creditors to redeem the property in the event that the
mortgagor fails to do so within the redemption period. Any creditor with a legal or
equitable lien on the property at the end of the redemption period has a right to
redeem provided that during that period the creditor filed a notice of intent to redeem. Id. § 580.24. Creditors may redeem in order of seniority during successive
five-day periods beginning immediately after expiration of the redemption period.
Id. A creditor redeems by paying the amount of the mortgage as well as the amount
of any prior liens that have been redeemed. Id.; see also Pamperin v. Scanlan, 28
Minn. 345, 9 N.W. 868 (1881) (judgment creditor who redeemed property required
to pay only the amount of the mortgage since senior creditor failed to redeem).
Thus, a creditor who has redeemed is able to apply the property to his or her lien.
Sprague v. Martin, 29 Minn. 226, 13 N.W. 34 (1882). It follows that on redemption,
a creditor's lien, including that of the last redeeming creditor, is extinguished to the
extent of the property. Id.
50. MINN. STAT. § 580.12; see also Klein, 9 F. Supp. at 60.
51. State v. Kerr, 51 Minn. 417, 420, 53 N.W. 719, 719 (1892). In Kerr, the court
denied respondent's plea for a 10-day injunction of the statutory redemption period.
Id. at 421, 53 N.W. at 719. In so doing, the court stated that "when a valid legislative
act has determined conditions on which rights shall vest or be forfeited, and no fraud
has been practiced, no court can interpose conditions or qualifications in violation of
the statute. The courts have no power to relieve against statutory forfeitures." Id. at
420-21, 53 N.W. at 719. Prior to foreclosure, the mortgagor or junior lienor may
enjoin the mortgagee from proceeding with the foreclosure if the mortgagor has previously filed a petition in bankruptcy. See F. & H. Inv. Co., 305 Minn. at 160, 232
N.W.2d at 773. In other words, the state court can intervene up to the point when
the sale vests rights in the purchaser. After foreclosure, however, the court will not
interfere with the operation of the statute. Kerr, 51 Minn. at 420-21, 53 N.W. at 719;
see also W.E. Suhring Co. v. Stafford, 166 Minn. 430, 432, 208 N.W. 136, 137 (1926)
(state court may not extend redemption period); Steele v. Bond, 32 Minn. 14, 21, 18
N.W. 830, 832 (1884) (purchaser at sale cannot extend redemption period).
52. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 108, 362 (1982). The nation's first uniform bankruptcy
laws were passed as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by
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Section 108 provides an automatic extension of the redemption
period to a debtor who files a petition in bankruptcy.53 This extension may not exceed the original redemption period by more than
sixty days.54 The automatic, limited extension provided by section
108 potentially conflicts with the extension available under section
362.55

Section 362 appears to automatically and indefinitely stay the running of the redemption period following a petition for bankruptcy.56
Under this section, actions against the estate's property are stayed
until that property is no longer property of the estate. 5 7 Other acBankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 259, 2682. Following seven years of study,
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982), scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(1982), and other scattered titles). The purpose of the bill was twofold: (1) to modernize bankruptcy law following the general adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code; and (2) to restructure the bankruptcy courts in order to efficiently handle the
increasing number and complexity of bankruptcy cases. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5787-89. For a
concise history of the amendments to the Act between 1898 and 1978, see Kennedy,
Foreward:A Brief Histoy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 667 (1980).

53. Section 108(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act provides in pertinent part that:
if applicable nonbankruptcy law. . . fixes a period within which the debtor
• . . may . . . cure a default, or perform any other similar act, and such

period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the
trustee may only . . . cure, or perform .

.

. before the later of-

(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occuring on or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) 60 days after the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 108(b). A debtor in possession may exercise the rights granted to the
trustee by § 108. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2). If the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy more than
59 days before the redemption period's expiration, § 108 does not extend the redemption period. See, e.g., Martinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 731 F.2d 543, 544-45 (8th
Cir. 1984). Section 108(b) could extend the redemption period for more than 60
days if, prior to the redemption period's expiration, the period is suspended under
another section; for example, under § 105. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b); see infra notes 134-36
and accompanying text.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 122-33.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 362; see infra note 84 (text of § 362(a)). In addition to listing
several other acts that are stayed, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the section specifies several
proceedings and acts that are not stayed. Id. § 362(b). The purpose of the stay provided by this section is to allow the debtor an opportunity to reorganize without
being subject to the "financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 52, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5840-41.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1). Property of the estate, as defined by § 541, consists of
all legal and equitable interests in property, wherever located, held by the debtor
when he files a petition in bankruptcy. Id. § 541(a)(1). Subject to the exceptions of
§ 541(b), (c)(2), and (d), property of the estate is broadly interpreted to include intangible property and causes of action. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 52, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6323. Property may cease to be property of the estate
through sale if the debtor retains no property interest. In re Cuba Elec. & Furniture
Corp., 430 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.P.R. 1977). Abandonment under § 554 and exemp-
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tions are stayed until the case is either closed or dismissed, or a discharge from bankruptcy is granted.58 Nevertheless, a creditor can
have the stay terminated or amended either for cause, 5 9 or because
the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is unnecessary for effective reorganization. 60 Due to the nature of a conveyance following a foreclosure sale under state law, controversy exists
concerning this section's applicability for staying the redemption period in Minnesota. 6 '
Section 105 gives the court general equitable powers to issue
whatever orders may be "necessary or appropriate" in carrying out
the Bankruptcy Code provisions.62 The power to toll the statutory
redemption period may be within this authority. 63 Important federal
interests must be present to justify extensions granted under section
tion under § 522 also cause property to cease being property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 554, 522. Such property becomes property of the debtor and, therefore, the stay
of an act against it is governed by § 362(c)(2). 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2); see infra note 62
and accompanying text.
The right of redemption is an interest in property which becomes part of the
estate if the debtor files for bankruptcy before the redemption period has expired. 4
541.07[3]
L. KING, M. COOK, R. AGOSTINO & A. PEDLAR, COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY
(15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. Under Minnesota law the debtor retains a right of redemption for six months following a foreclosure sale. MINN. STAT.
§ 580.23(1). In some instances, the debtor may have up to one year to redeem. Id.
§ 580.23(2).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).
59. Id. § 362(d)(1). Section 362(d)(1) suggests "lack of adequate protection" as
one cause for granting relief from the stay. "Adequate protection" continues to be
defined on a case-by-case basis. Compare F. & M. Mortgage Corp. v. A. & A. Constr.
Co. (In re A. & A. Const. Co.), 31 Bankr. 81 (Bankr. D. Va. 1983) (equity of more than
$75,000 for loan balance of $588,500 provided adequate protection) with Commonwealth State Employment Retirement Fund v. Roane, 14 Bankr. 542, 545 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (federal mortgage guarantee constitutes adequate protection). Other potential
causes for granting relief from the stay include: whether the debtor is insured
against the claim, whether rights of a third party are involved, whether the stayed
action is only remotely related to the chapter 11 case, and whether the debtor is
merely a fiduciary in a proceeding. 2 COLLIER, supra note 57, 362.07[3].
60. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
61. The argument against applicability is that, because there is no affirmative act
by the purchaser following the foreclosure sale, there is nothing to be enjoined. See,
e.g., Bank of Commonwealth v. Bevan, 13 Bankr. 989, 993 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(Q 362(a) stay does not affect running of specific time periods). But see Moratzka v.
Lanesboro State Bank (In re Johnson), 8 Bankr. 371, 374-75 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 105. Section 105 provides, in pertinent part: "The bankruptcy
court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title." Id.
63. In light of the increased powers of the bankruptcy court under the new act,
the limitation on the bankruptcy judge's power of injunction has been removed. S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 52, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5815; see Bevan, 13
Bankr. at 989; 2 COLLIER, supra note 57, $ 362.02.
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105.64
III.

AUTHORITY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT

A.

Section 108

InJohnson, the court acknowledged in dicta that section 108(b) extends the redemption period.65 This interpretation is accepted by a
majority of jurisdictions.66 The explicit language of section 108
mandates that a debtor who files a petition in bankruptcy during the
redemption period is granted up to sixty additional days to redeem
the property. 67

Although the section only grants power to the

trustee, 6 8 debtors in possession generally have all the rights of trustees in a reorganization case. 6 9 Since these rights include the right to
file a petition for reorganization,70 the debtor in possession who files
will be granted the extension provided in section 108(b).71 Thus,
section 108(b) provides the debtor with a potential, although limited,
72
extension of the redemption period.
TheJohnson court ruled that section 108 was an appropriate source

of authority by which the bankruptcy court could extend the John64. See infra text accompanying notes 136-45.
65. 719 F.2d at 275-76, 278. The extension provided under § 108(b), if valid,
had expired prior to the appeals court's decision. Id. at 278; see infra note 74.
66. See, e.g., Bevan, 13 Bankr. at 994; In re Owens, 27 Bankr. 946, 950 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1983); Martinson v. First Nat'l Bank of Oakes (In re Martinson), 26 Bankr.
648, 653 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 731 F.2d 543 (8th Cir.
1984); Jenkins v. Peet (In re Jenkins), 13 Bankr. 721, 724 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981);
Ecklund & Swedlund Dev. Corp. v. Hennepin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 17 Bankr. 451,
455 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); Columbine P. & S. Fund, Inc. v. Hellenschmidt (In re
Hellenschmidt), 5 Bankr. 758, 760 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); 4 COLLIER, supra note 57,
541.07[3]; accord In re H. & W. Enters., 19 Bankr. 582, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1982); Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 375; see also In re Headley, 13 Bankr. 295, 298 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1981) (court refers to § 108(b) in dicta). Contra Cramer v. Markee (In re
Markee), 31 Bankr. 429, 431 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); Federal Land Bank v. Brown (In
re James), 20 Bankr. 145 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2).
68. Id. § 108(b). One court has held that because the section explicitly grants
power only to the trustee, debtors in possession are not allowed to avail themselves
of the extension provided in § 108(b). Martinson, 26 Bankr. at 653-54; see also United
Bank of Loves Park v. Dohm (In re Dohm), 14 Bankr. 701, 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981)
(dicta).
69. Id. § 1107. Only the right to compensation under 11 U.S.C. § 330 is excluded. Id.
70. See id. Section 103(a) makes the fights granted by § 1107 applicable to
§ 108(b). Corman v. Hospitality Restaurants (In re Interstate Restaurant Sys. Inc.),
26 Bankr. 298, 301 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Santa Fe Dev. & Mortgage Corp. v. McCormack (In re Sante Fe Dev. & Mortgage Corp.), 16 Bankr. 165, 167 n.1 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1981). Contra Dohm, 14 Bankr. at 702.
71. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
72. 719 F.2d at 275-76, 278.
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sons' statutory redemption period. 73 Nevertheless, the limited relief
available under section 108 had already expired by the time the district court issued its decision. 74 Thus, the Johnsons relied on the
longer extensions under sections 362 and 105.
B.

Section 362

The automatic stay provided by section 362 is one of the debtor's
fundamental sources of protection under the bankruptcy laws.75 It is

intended to "stop all collection efforts, all harassment, and all fore77
closure actions."76 The stay is also intended to protect creditors.
Rather than allow the debtor's estate to be greatly diminished by
paying the claims of one diligent creditor, the stay freezes the
debtor's estate until a reorganization plan is implemented. 78 Consequently, the claims of all creditors can be handled fairly. 79
Although the Johnson court acknowledged that the legislative policies behind section 362 would favor staying the statutory redemption
period in the Johnsons' case, the court held that section 362 was in73. Id. at 278; see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
74. Since the debtor filed the petition in bankruptcy on October 8, 1981,
§ 108(b) would have extended the redemption period to December 8, 1981, 60 days
after the filing of the petition. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Thus, the
redemption period had expired over three months before the district court's decision
on March 17, 1982. 719 F.2d at 278.
75.

S. REP. No. 989, supra note 52, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5840-

41.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 5841.
78. See H. & W. Enters., 19 Bankr. at 587-88; Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 574-75. Section 362(d) provides that the stay may be lifted if the creditor can show cause or,
alternatively, if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d); see supra note 61.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6297:
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the
debtor's property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the
claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy
is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all
creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the
debtor's assets prevents that.
Id. The late Judge Jacob Dim, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of
Minnesota, elaborated on the purpose of § 362 as it relates to the other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code:
The purpose of bankruptcy is to provide an equal opportunity for all creditors to share in the assets of the debtor available for distribution. § 362(a) is
the linchpin in this statutory scheme. It is designed to prevent the piecemeal dismemberment of the debtor's assets by creditors. By preventing
creditors from attacking the debtor's estate, the automatic stay gives the
trustee time to identify, marshall, and distribute equitably the assets of the
debtor.
Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 374.
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applicable.80 In support of its holding, the court determined that
Congress did not intend section 362 to stay the running of a statutory time period.8 1 TheJohnson court also reasoned that, as a matter
of statutory construction, section 362 could not operate to stay the
statutory redemption period.82
1. Legislative Intent
a. Affirmative Acts vs. Passage of Time
The Johnson court found that the language of section 362 implied
that Congress intended to stay only affirmative acts. 8 3 The statutory
language uses active terms, such as "commencements," "enforcements," or specific "acts," to describe the proceedings stayed by section 362.84 As the Johnson court noted, however, a purchaser at a
foreclosure sale in Minnesota can obtain absolute title to the property by the mere passage of time.85
This narrow interpretation of "act" as used in section 362 is contrary to the holding in the leading Minnesota bankruptcy case of
80. 719 F.2d at 276.
81. Id. at 276-77.
82. Id. at 278.
83. Id.; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (regarding "enforcement"); id. § 362(a)(3)-(6)
(regarding "act").
84. Section 362 states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (emphasis added).
85. 719 F.2d at 276-77. Following the sale, the mere running of time vests absolute title in the purchaser. See Klien, 9 F. Supp. at 60 (construing statutory scheme).
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Moratzka v. Lanesboro State Bank. 86 After referring to the liberal purposes of the section 362 stay, the Moratzka court stated that the section and each subdivision must be liberally construed in order to
7
provide the broadest protection to the debtor and other creditors.8
Unlike the Johnson court, the Moratzka court found that several subdivisions were applicable to stay the running of the redemption period.88 The Moratzka court reasoned that because the running of the
redemption period is a necessary part of the foreclosure proceeding,
after which the debtor loses certain rights and the creditor perfects
title, the running of the redemption period is "the enforcement...
of a judgment" under section 362(a)(2).89
The Moratzka court held that in addition to overt actions, the
meaning of "act" within section 362 encompasses "all changes in the
relationship beween the debtor and his creditors."90 The running of
the redemption period triggers a change in this relationship 9 ' in violation of section 362(a)(3), which stays "any act to obtain possession
of property of the estate." 92 This alteration in the debtor-creditor
relationship is also contrary to section 362(a) (4), which stays "any act
to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against the property of the
93

estate."

In rejecting the applicability of section 362 for tolling the redemption period, the circuit court distinguished Johnson from decisions
finding section 362 applicable.94 The Johnson court noted that these
decisions involved state laws requiring some affirmative act to be
taken after the foreclosure sale in order to transfer full title to the
purchaser.95
Jenkins v. Peet (In reJenkins),96 one of the cases distinguished by the
86. 8 Bankr. 371, 374-75 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (liberal interpretation of "act"
and the explicit language of § 108 mandate that § 362 stays the redemption period).
For a partial list of bankruptcy cases following Moratzka, see infra note 129.
87. Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 374.

88. Id.
89. Id Enforcement, according to Moratzka, must not be read restrictively. Id.
In the context of § 362, enforcement "means causing to have effect." Id. The running of the redemption period, because it causes the foreclosure sale to have an effect, is within the meaning of enforcement. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. A properly recorded certificate of sale does not convey absolute title to
the purchaser until the redemption period has expired. MINN. STAT. § 580.12.
92. Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 374 (quoting § 362(a)(3)).
93. Id. (quoting § 362(a)(4)).
94. 719 F.2d at 277. The court distinguished Jenkins v. Peet (In reJenkins), 19
Bankr. 105 (D. Colo. 1982); Eaton Land & Cattle Co.II v. Rocky Mountain Inv., 28
Bankr. 890 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (following Jenkins); and Sapphire Inv. v. Stewart
Title & Trust (In re Sapphire Inv.), 19 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982).
95. 719 F.2d at 277.
96. 19 Bankr. 105 (D. Colo. 1982). In Jenkins, mortgages on four parcels of land
were foreclosed and certificates of purchase were issued for each. Id. at 106. The
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Johnson court, held that section 362 stays the redemption period because under Colorado law, title did not transfer to the purchaser unless or until a deed was executed and delivered to the purchaser
within the statutory time period. 9 7 Thus, theJenkins court found that
section 362 prohibited the purchaser from applying for the trustee's
98
deed-an affirmative act.

The Johnson court also cited Sapphire Investments v. Stewart Title and
Trust (In re Sapphire Investments) 99 in support of its proposition. This
case, however, fails to support the Johnson court's argument. Under
Arizona law, an affirmative act after the foreclosure sale is required
to convey absolute title to the purchaser.t00 This requirement was
not the controlling factor in the Sapphire court's analysis. In discussing the applicability of section 362 for staying the redemption period
under Arizona law, that court favorably cited the Moratzka court's application of section 362 under Minnesota law.lOl In so doing, the
Sapphire court adopted the second prong of the Moratzka analysis:
the explicit language of section 108 mandates that section 362 authorize tolling the statutory redemption period.102 Since the Sapphire
court's reasoning was based on the similarity between Minnesota and
Arizona law, rather than on Arizona's requirement of an affirmative
debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy after the redemption period had expired on two
parcels, but before the purchaser had applied for a public trustee's deed for one of
the parcels. Id. The court held that § 362(a)(4) prohibited the application for
trustee's deeds for three parcels and that § 362(a)(1) tolled the redemption period
on the two parcels for which the redemption period had not yet expired. Id. at 110.
97. Id. at 107-10; see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-39-111 (1973). Under Colorado's
foreclosure law, the purchaser must apply for a deed within nine months after the
expiration of the last redemption period. Failing this, the deed cannot be executed
and all rights under the certificate of purchase are terminated automatically. Id.
The same judge who decided Jenkins reconsidered the applicability of § 362 in
Westergaard v. Cucumber Creek Dev., Inc. (In re Cucumber Creek Dev., Inc.), 33
Bankr. 820 (D. Colo. 1983). "In Jenkins, however, I did not discuss or consider the
applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 108 to such a case . .

.

. I now conclude that § 362(a) is

inapplicable, and that state redemptive rights may be preserved and extended only to
the extent provided by § 108." 33 Bankr. at 821. Thus,Jenkins has lost much of its
force as authority for extending the redemption period under § 362. See 2 COLLIER,
supra note 57, 108.03, at 108-6 n.2.
98. Jenkins, 19 Bankr. at 110.
99. 19 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982). In Sapphire, a creditor initiated a foreclosure proceeding against the mortgagor and purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. The debtor filed a petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code prior
to the expiration of the redemption period. Id. at 493. The court held that
§ 362(a)(2)-(4) tolls the running of the redemption period. Id. at 495.
100. Under Arizona foreclosure law, the sheriff executes and delivers a deed to
the purchaser after the expiration of all applicable redemption periods. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1286 (1982).
101. Sapphire, 19 Bankr. at 495.
102. See id.
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act, 10 3 theJohnson court's reliance on the peculiarities of Arizona law
as a distinguishing factor of Sapphire is misplaced. The Johnson
court's argument that section 362 is only intended to stay affirmative
acts is contrary to the broad policies of section 362 and cannot serve
as a basis for distinguishing Sapphire.104
b. Legislative History
The Johnson court also based its holding on the legislative history
of section 362.105 Section 362 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code simplified the law regarding automatic stays by replacing various scattered
rules and code provisions aimed at staying different actions.106 As
noted in Johnson, Congress chose to substantially retain the language
of the previous statutes.1 0 7 Consequently, the court reasoned that
since a clear majority of cases have held the early provisions inapplicable for tolling a redemption period, courts should similarly construe section 362 to reach the same result.108
Nevertheless, case law under the prior bankruptcy act is not as
one-sided as Johnson suggests.t 09 For example, in 1972 the Ninth
Circuit held that sections 116(4) and 148 of the old bankruptcy act" 10
103. "The rights of a redemption holder in Minnesota and Arizona are quite similar. In Arizona a mortgagor/debtor is entitled to possession of premises sold at a
foreclosure sale unless a receiver has been appointed." Id.
104. See also In re Shea Realty, Inc., 21 Bankr. 790, 792-93 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982)
(favorably citing the rationale of Moratzka and holding that § 362 tolls the redemption period because the debtor has a substantial right postponing the enforcement of
the lien); In re H. & W. Enters., Inc., 19 Bankr. 582, 585-86 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982)
(adopting the Moratzka rationale and rejectingJenkins because it failed to consider the
purpose of § 362); United Bank of Loves Park v. Dohm (In re Dohm), 14 Bankr. 701,
702 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (adopting Moratzka; § 362 tolls Illinois redemption
period).
105. 719 F.2d at 276-77.
106. 2 COLLIER, supra note 57, 362.01; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 29(a), 35(c)(4), 513,
516(4), 663, 714, 814, 828, 917, 1014 (1976) (repealed 1978); id. app. 401, 601, 8501, 10-104(c), 10-105(d), 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, 13-401 (1976) (repealed 1978)
(Rules).
107. 719 F.2d at 277.
108. Id. The following cases cited by the Johnson court are on point: In re Nelson,
9 F. Supp. 657 (D.S.D. 1935); In re Klein, 9 F. Supp. 57 (D. Minn. 1934); Garber v.
Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d 609 (D. Kan. 1928); see also Kennedy, Automatic Stays
Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 1, 16 n.56 (1978). "[A]bsent a

clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed
to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction." Id. (citing Kansas
City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 275 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912
(1962)).
109. Anderson, Extension of Statutory Redemption and Cure Periods by the Bankruptcy
Court:Johnson v. First National Bank and Its Aftermath, 2 MINN. REAL ESTATE L.J. 53,
60 (1984) (suggesting that the case law is "too confused to permit a court to draw a
clear inference as to Congress's intent").
110. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
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operated to toll the redemption period."' Thus, the legislative history of section 362 does not clearly indicate which of the two opposing viewpoints112 under the old provisions should be adopted in
construing section 362.113
c. Absence of Explicit Language
The third observation inJohnson regarding the intent of Congress
in passing section 362 is somewhat more convincing. An earlier provision under the prior bankruptcy act explicitly authorized an automatic stay of the redemption period.' 14 The court reasoned that the
elimination of this provision indicated an intent that the section not
stay the redemption period.115 This conclusion may be assuming
too much, since the earlier provision had expired almost thirty years
prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 116 and thus was
not one of the provisions that section 362 was designed to replace. 117 The court's conclusion is further weakened in view of Congress' expressed purpose of expanding the scope of the automatic
111. Hamblen v. Federal Say. & Loan Co. (In re Grosso), 457 F.2d 168, 173 (9th
Cir. 1972). In support of this holding, the Hamblen court stated that drafters of the
statute intended the stay provisions to be liberally construed in order to facilitate
rehabilitating the debtor. Id. at 172 & n.8 (citing In re Maier Brewing Co., 38 F.
Supp. 806, 814 (S.D. Cal. 1941)); see also Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 373 (citing legislative
history indicating that § 362 differs from the prior stay provisions, and concluding
that the scope of § 362 cannot be determined by reliance on cases decided prior to
the 1978 Code).
112. Perhaps Hamblen does not really espouse an opposing viewpoint. One court
has suggested that the Hamblen court's reference to its power to protect the property
of debtors, 457 F.2d at 172, implies that the court was contemplating a source of
authority for the stay more akin to § 105 than to § 362. See Bevan, 13 Bankr. at 996
n.14. The stay under § 362 is automatic and does not require the court to use any
power of its own. See id. Under this reading, the Hamblen holding regarding § 116(4)
and § 148 of the former bankruptcy act does not support the proposition that § 362
tolls the redemption period.
113. Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 373; see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 57, 362.01.
114. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942, 942 (expired on its own terms on
March 1, 1949). The Act provided that the redemption period be automatically
stayed upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy for the reorganization of a family
farm. Id.
115. 719 F.2d at 276. The court's reasoning appears to be that since Congress
had explicitly provided for an automatic stay of the redemption period in the past,
Congress would have again used express language in § 362 if that was its intent. See
id.

116. The period for filing under the provision was extended several times. The
last extension was to March 1, 1949. Act of Apr. 21, 1948, ch. 225, 62 Stat. 198, 198.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act was passed on November 6, 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982), scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. (1982), and other scattered titles).
117. See supra note 106 (regarding the sections replaced by 11 U.S.C. § 362).
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stay.1 18

d. Summary
On close examination, none of the observations in Johnson overwhelmingly support a ruling that courts should not use section 362
to toll redemption periods. Careful case analysis fails to adequately
distinguish Johnson from cases granting stays under section 362.119
The Johnson court's legislative intent analysis is also unpersuasive.
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code is ambiguous and the
prior, explicit Act provision was probably not considered by Congress.120 In light of the liberal legislative policies supporting section
362,121 the Johnson court should not have rejected an application of
section 362 on the basis of legislative intent.
2.

Statutory Construction

In addition to congressional intent, the court of appeals based its
holding that section 362 was not applicable on the construction of
section 362 when read concurrently with section 108.122 Although
the court's brief treatment appears to minimize its importance, this
second basis is more convincing than the court's legislative intent
analysis.
Under general rules of statutory construction, a section of a statute
should be read and interpreted within the context of the entire
act.12 3 Courts should not interpret a section so that other sections
are rendered superfluous.124 Moreover, general terms in one section may be limited by specific terms in an associated section.t25
Consequently, section 362(a) and section 108(b) must be read together to determine if the automatic stay of section 362(a) will stay
the running of the redemption period.
Section 108(b) specifically addresses the suspension of time periods for curing defaults. It provides that the filing of a petition during the redemption period will automatically extend the redemption
118. The automatic stay of § 362 differs in some ways from the stays provided by
the provisions under the former bankruptcy act. "The new stay expands coverage in
some areas, reduces it in others, and clarifies many uncertain aspects of the current
provisions." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 79, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6135.
119. See supra notes 79-104 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 118.

122. See 719 F.2d at 277 ("Our conclusion regarding § 362(a) is also based in part
upon the presence in the Code of § 108(b)").
123. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
124. See Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745,
747 (C.D. Mich. 1977).
125. F. McCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 15 (1953).
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period by a maximum of sixty days.' 26
In contrast, section 362(a), if applicable, automatically extends the
redemption period indefinitely: "a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title. . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities ......
127 The stay continues until the conditions of section
362(c) are met or until the purchaser requests relief from the stay
under section 362(d) and is granted relief under section 362(d) or
(f).128 Unlike section 108, section 362 does not state a maximum
length for the stay it provides.
Thus, interpreting section 362(a) to indefinitely toll the redemption period inevitably conflicts with the specific limitations of the automatic stay in section 108(b). Since section 108(b) explicitly
provides for a stay of the redemption period, the contrary interpreta29
tion of section 362(a) is improper.'
30
Moratzka' and its progeny'31 came to the opposite conclusion,
ruling that a stay of the redemption period under section 362(a) is
not precluded by a joint reading of section 362(a) and section
108(b).132 The Moratzka court noted that section 108(b)(1) explicitly

acknowledges that the redemption period may be suspended under
some other authority.t33 Moratzka erroneously concluded, however,
that section 362(a) is the only possible source of such authority. 134 If
126.

11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1982); see supra note 53 (text of § 108).

127. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
128. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
129. See Bank of Commonwealth v. Bevan, 13 Bankr. 989, 992-94 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Markee v. Markee (In re Markee), 31 Bankr. 429, 431 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983);
In re Owens, 27 Bankr. 946, 948-50 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); Martinson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 26 Bankr. 648, 652-53 (D.N.D. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 731 F.2d 543
(8th Cir. 1984); In re Murphy, 22 Bankr. 663, 666 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); Sun
Bank/Suncoast v. Construction Leasing & Inv. Corp. (In re Constr. Leasing & Inv.
Corp.), 20 Bankr. 546, 547 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Ecklund & Swedlund Dev. Corp.
v. Hennepin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Ecklund & Swedlund Dev. Corp.), 17
Bankr. 451, 455 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
130. 8 Bankr. 371 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
131. In re Shea Realty, Inc., 21 Bankr. 790, 793 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); In re H. & W.
Enters., Inc., 19 Bankr. 582, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982); United Bank of Loves Park
v. Dohm (In re Dohm), 14 Bankr. 701, 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
132. Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 375; see 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) ("the trustee may only file
...before the later of-(l) the end of such period, including any suspension of such
period occurring on or after the commencement of the case").
133. Moratzka, 8 Bankr. at 375. "While § 108 does ensure the trustee certain time
to act, it also expressly recognizes that the running of time may be suspended.
§ 362(a) is the only possible source of such a suspension 'on or after the commencement of the case.' " Id.; see infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
134. Cf H. & W Enters., 19 Bankr. 582.

In one sense, the [Moratzka] court may have overstated its argument. It is
not clear that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is "the only possible source of such a suspension 'on or after the commencement of the case .... .' " The possibility
of an extension of a redemption period pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105, how-
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this were true, the Moratzka court's reasoning would be persuasive
since a construction of section 108(b) would be ambivalent, at worst,
toward the authorization of an automatic, indefinite tolling of the redemption period under section 362(a). On the one hand, the time
limitations of a stay under section 108(b)(2) conflict with the indefinite duration of a stay under section 362(a). On the other hand, the
explicit language of section 108(b) would require the conclusion that
section 362(a)(1) authorizes a tolling of the redemption period.
The Moratzka court's reasoning fails, however, because section
362(a) is not the only possible source of authority for the suspension
of the redemption period described in section 108(b).135 Section
105 has been recognized as potentially authorizing a stay of the redemption period.I3 6 Since the tolling period under section 108(b)
could potentially be extended by section 105, the language of section
108(b) does not require that section 362(a) authorize a stay of the
redemption period. Absent this conflicting construction of section
108(b), the Johnson court's reasoning is conclusive: ajoint reading of
section 108(b) and section 362(a) precludes tolling of the redemption period under section 362(a).
C.

Section 105

Although section 108(b) extends the redemption period, the relief
provided under that section is slight. Furthermore, as discussed
above, a joint reading of sections 108(b) and 362(a) prevents a construction by which the indefinite stay of section 362(a) would toll the
redemption period. To achieve a longer period of relief, a debtor
must obtain an injunction issued pursuant to the court's general eqever, does not detract from the major point the [Moratzka] court was attempting to make: that I I U.S.C. § 362(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) can be
read together in a consistent manner.
Id. at 587 n.3 (citation omitted).
135. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
136. See infra note 139 and accompanying text. One commentator argues that the
redemption period need not be extended at all for the debtor's benefit. Note, Proposed Changes in Minnesota Mortgage Law, 50 MINN. L. REV. 331 (1965). The author of
this note argues that the redemption period has failed to significantly increase the
debtor's likelihood of acquiring refinancing and has depressed the bidding prices at
foreclosure sales. Id. at 335. Rather, the redemption period unnecessarily deprives
the mortgagees of an expeditious acquisition of their security which ultimately results
in increased costs of obtaining credit. Id. at 336-37. The author, therefore, suggests
shortening the redemption period. Id. at 337, 338 n.21. It should be noted that at
the time the note was written, all debtors were allowed a 12-month redemption period under MINN. STAT. § 580.23. Id. at 332 n.3. In 1967, the statute was amended to
provide for only a six-month period for most debtors. Act of Apr. 28, 1967, ch. 248,
§ 4, 1967 Minn. Laws 390, 392. For farmers, however, the 12-month redemption
period was retained. Id. (12-month period applies where the mortgaged premises
exceed 10 acres).
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uitable powers under section 105. The Johnson court held that it was
not empowered to enjoin the running of the redemption period
under section 105 because there was no explicit statutory authority
in that section and because there were no important federal interests
justifying an interference with state-created property rights.'3 7
1. Restraining Federal Court Intervention Under Butner
Prior to Johnson, the applicability of section 105 for tolling the redemption period had not been decided by any circuit court.' 3 8 The
Eighth Circuit noted, however, that several district and bankruptcy
courts had considered the issue and were divided as to whether section 105 authorized the court to toll the redemption period.139 In
holding that section 105 does not authorize tolling the redemption
period, the Johnson court primarily relied on Butner v. United States, 140
137. 719 F.2d at 275.
138. "The issue as to whether the broad powers granted the bankruptcy court by
§ 105(a) . . .empower the court to suspend the running of a statutory period of
redemption is a matter of first impression among the circuit courts." 719 F.2d at
273.
139. Id.; see First Nat'l Bank v.Johnson, 19 Bankr. 651, 654 (D. Minn. 1982). Compare Bevan, 13 Bankr. at 995 (statutory right of redemption may be tolled under
§ 105) with Cramer, 31 Bankr. at 432 (§ 105(a) should not be used to further extend
period to redeem) andMartinson, 26 Bankr. at 654 (appropriate to extend time limitation under § 105(a) in present case) and Federal Land Bank v. Brown (In re James),
20 Bankr. 145, 150-51 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (§ 105(a) does not toll Michigan's
statutory redemption period) and In re Headley, 13 Bankr. 295, 296-97 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1981) (§ 105(a) can be used to expand the redemption period only in the face
of fraud, mistake, or agreement).
140. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Although the Court's decision was issued on February
21, 1979, the case originated when a petition was filed in 1973 under the former
Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 49-50. For a history of the present Bankruptcy Code, see supra
note 56.
The Johnson court's reliance on the rationale in Butner and its refusal to intervene
is inconsistent with its subsequent holding in Hulm v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 738
F.2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984). In Hulm, the Eighth Circuit
vacated a bankruptcy court's upholding of a foreclosure sale. Id.at 327. The Hulm
court remanded, holding that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine
whether a sale price provided a reasonably equivalent value. Id. Section 548 provides for avoidance of fraudulent transfers: "The trustee may avoid any transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property.

. .

if the debtor.

.

.(2)(A) received less than a

reasonable equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation .... ." 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 548 is not a mandate that in all
cases an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine whether a sale price provided
a reasonably equivalent value. Section 548 is no more a mandate to require evidentiary hearings than § 105 is a mandate to stay the redemption period.
Unlike Johnson, the Hulm court did not cite any federal interests which would
justify its intervention into matters of state law. The Hulm decision, in requiring an
evidentiary hearing, makes no mention of the Butner prohibitions it had recently relied on in Johnson to refuse tolling the statutory redemption period.
Unlike Johnson, the Eighth Circuit in Hulm willingly intervened to adjust the
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a pre-Code United States Supreme Court decision.141 The Butner
Court stated that although Congress' authority to establish bankruptcy laws is broad,142 "Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state
law."14 3 In the absence of a congressional command, therefore,
state law will govern the determination of property rights unless a
federal interest requires a different result.144 According to the
Court, the resulting "[u]niform treatment of property interests by
both state and federal courts within a state serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from
receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy.' "145
Applying the Butner rationale, the Johnson court failed to find explicit language in section 105 that could be interpreted as a congressional mandate to extend the redemption period.146 The court was
also unaware of any federal interest that would justify tampering with
the creditor's property rights created by state law.147
The Johnson court's resolution apparently furthers the policies outlined in Butner.1 4 8 An extension of the redemption period under section 105 would cause uncertainty among junior creditors who, in
order to protect their security, must redeem within consecutive fiveday periods following the expiration of the redemption period.149
Second, the possibility of being granted an extension of the redemption period, a remedy not available under state law,150 may encourage the debtor to choose the federal court forum over the state
court. Finally, the bankruptcy proceeding would grant the debtor a
windfall-the extended use of the property.
property rights of a petitioner in bankruptcy under § 548 despite the lack of a clear
congressional mandate to do so. Id. Since the circuit court found grounds to vacate
an order upholding a foreclosure sale in Hulm, theJohnson court similarly could have
exercised its broad equitable powers under § 105 to stay the redemption period's

expiration..
141. 719 F.2d at 273-75.
142. See 440 U.S. at 54. "The constitutional authority of Congress to establish
'uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States' " is
broad. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4).
143. Id. This generalization appears to apply to Johnson since under § 541 of the
Code the right of redemption is property of the estate. See supra note 57.
144. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
145. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
146. See 719 F.2d at 274. The court recognized that § 105 granted the bankruptcy
courts broad equitable powers, but held that such relief could not be granted "absent
fraud, mistake, accident, or erroneous conduct on the part of the foreclosing officer."
Id.
147. Id. at 275.
148. See supra text accompanying note 145.
149. MINN. STAT. § 580.24 (1984).
150. See supra note 51.
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The Johnson court's holding that section 105 does not operate to
toll the redemption period appears to follow the holding and policies
enunciated in Butner. Nevertheless, further consideration of the circumstances of debtors and creditors in cases such as Johnson reveals
several reasons supporting section 105 as authority for tolling the
redemption period. Since these reasons satisfy the conditions set
forth in Butner, they should also apply to Johnson.
2. Federal Interests
Citing Butner, the Johnson court suggested that a federal interest
would justify enjoining the running of the redemption period under
section 105.151 One compelling federal interest protected by the
Bankruptcy Code maintains that individual creditors should not gain
an unfair advantage over other creditors in the satisfaction of their
claims. 1 52 Absent the bankruptcy proceeding, secured creditors
would be able to protect their interest by redeeming the property
after the termination of the redemption period.'53 Since they must
redeem in order of seniority by paying off all previously redeemed
liens, however, some secured creditors are unable to protect their
interests.154 Furthermore, without the protection of the bankruptcy
process, general creditors are unable to protect their interests.t55
It is evident from the legislative history that a different result is
intended when a debtor enters bankruptcy. The bankruptcy proceeding discourages a debtor from favoring large creditors over
small creditors.15 6 Thus, no creditor through diligence obtains an
advantage over other creditors.15 7 If the sum of secured creditors'
claims exceeds the value of the property, all undersecured creditors
151. 719 F.2d at 274, 275 (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 55).
152. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 79, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at

6180.
When a petition is filed, all creditor actions against the debtor are stayed.
The stay gives the debtor the opportunity to bring all of its creditors together for discussion, explanation of the debtor's financial problems, and
negotiation. Creditors are prevented from acting unilaterally to gain an advantage over other creditors or to pressure the debtor into action.
Id. (footnote omitted). "Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation
procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that." Id. at 6297.
153.

MINN. STAT. § 580.24.

154. See id. Once the redemption price, including the sum of all redeemed liens,
exceeds the fair market value of the property, it is not reasonable for a creditor to
protect his or her interest by redeeming.
155. In order to have a right to redeem property from a foreclosure sale, a creditor must have a lien upon the property which, when executed, will allow the creditor
to seize the property. MINN. STAT. § 580.24; see also Beigler v. Chamberlin, 145 Minn.
104, 106, 176 N.W. 49, 50 (1920).
156.
157.

S. REP. No. 989, supra note 52, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5796.
See supra note 152.
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of the same class are treated equally.15 8 On the other hand, if the
value of the property exceeds the sum of secured creditors' claims,
the general creditors' claims are addressed in the reorganization
plan.'59 A stay of the redemption period under section 105 there-

fore protects the federal interest of equitable treatment of creditors
in bankruptcy.
If the Johnson court had enjoined the running of the redemption
period after the Johnsons filed for reorganization, the Johnsons'
farm would have remained in the bankruptcy estate.' 60 Instead, the

estate's major asset was lost, leaving very little for the satisfaction of
other creditors' claims. The Johnson court's failure to act allowed one
diligent creditor to gain an unfair advantage over the Johnsons'
other creditors, contrary to federal bankruptcy policy.161
A second reason to allow tolling of the redemption period under

section 105 is the federal interest in preserving the assets required

by the debtor for the operation of his or her business. 162 Because
assets are more valuable when used for production than when sold
outright,163 a reorganization plan should restructure the debtor's
terms with his or her creditors to allow a gradual payback from the
debtor's business income. As applied to the Johnsons' situation, a
stay of the redemption period under section 105 serves the federal

interest of preserving the debtor's assets. The tolling of the redemption period preserves the right of farmers to possess their property
and operate their farms.
3.

Policy Considerations

The Johnson court's decision appears to further the Butner policies
of reducing uncertainty, discouraging forum shopping, and prevent158. A reorganization plan is considered fair and equitable to a dissenting class of
secured creditors if one of three conditions is met. First, the creditors can be allowed
to retain their secured interests and receive deferred payments which aggregate to
the value of the secured claims and have a present value equal to the value of the
collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). Second, the plan can provide that the creditors realize an "indubitable equivalent" of their secured claims. Id.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). Third, the collateral can be sold and the creditors' security interests can attach to the proceeds by way of either of the above two methods. Id.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
159. A reorganization plan is considered fair and equitable to a dissenting class of
unsecured creditors when that class is fully compensated or when, if not fully compensated, no senior class receives more than 100% of its claims and no junior class
receives anything. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
160. Seesupra note 152.
161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 79, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at
6179.
163. Id.
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ing windfalls to those who file for bankruptcy.164 Closer examination, however, reveals that an injunction under section 105 would
not necessarily violate these policies. The Butner court's concern
with policies was secondary to its concern with the existence of federal interests.165 The federal interests discussed above would justify
an injunction under section 105 even if the Butner policies were violated as a result.
There is no apparent reason why a stay of the redemption period
under section 105 should necessarily result in uncertainty for junior
creditors. Since a junior creditor's right to redeem following the expiration of the redemption period is preserved only on filing a notice
of intent to redeem,166 a complete record exists of all creditors
whose rights would be affected by the stay. The bankruptcy court
could order that all creditors who have preserved their right to redeem be notified of the extension, the redemption period, and the
effective date of the lifting of the stay. While this method may not
provide the creditors with as much certainty as they would have, for
example, under the specific extension of the redemption period by
section 108(b), the creditor's rights would be ascertainable. In any
case, as discussed below, the existence of a federal interest in altering property rights would justify any resulting uncertainty.
The Bankruptcy Code offers several means by which the federal
courts may alter property rights fixed by state law. 167 Arguably, the
favorable treatment in each instance provides the debtor an incentive
to obtain a federal forum. Similarly, the debtor who succeeds in obtaining federal jurisdiction by filing bankruptcy acquires a windfall to
the extent that applicable federal law increases his or her property
rights. Federal courts are willing to act contrary to these policies
when their authority is express under the Code. Furthermore, Butner
does not require that these policies be upheld when there are federal
interests favoring interference with state property laws.
Federal courts should not refuse to exercise their general powers
under section 105 when important federal interests are at stake.168
The Butner court's discussion of these policy considerations was
merely intended to emphasize the necessity of a federal interest in
altering property rights when Congress has not specifically author164. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
165. See infra note 169.
166. MINN. STAT. § 580.24.
167. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b)(1), 1124(2) (allow debtor to avoid acceleration
provisions of executory contracts); id. § 365(e)(2) (prevents creditors from restricting
the assignment of rights or delegation of duties in executory contracts); id.
§ 522(f)(l)-(2) (allows debtor to avoid the attachment of a judicial lien or a nonpossessory, purchase-money security interest against exempted property).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 152-59.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/5

24

et al.: Bankruptcy: Can It Save the Family Farm? [Johnson v. First Nation
1985]

BANKRUPTCY: CAN IT SAVE THE FAMILY FARM?

1043

ized the court to act.16 9 A close reading of Butner reveals that such
policies are secondary to the existence of a federal interest. The
bankruptcy court's stay of the redemption period under section 105
creates an incentive for forum shopping and provides the debtor
with a windfall. Nevertheless, the stay serves important federal inter-

ests which, under Butner, justify the alteration of property rights.
CONCLUSION

Following a foreclosure sale, a Minnesota farmer who faces losing
his or her farm must turn to the bankruptcy court for relief. A
farmer in these circumstances has already exhausted the limited relief provided by the mortgage foreclosure moratorium170 which
merely forestalls the foreclosure sale.17 1 Given the legislative history
of Minnesota foreclosure law, the legislature will not likely increase
the redemption period.172 Furthermore, the state courts are unable
to toll the redemption period.173 Thus, the federal bankruptcy
courts provide the only option to the failing farmer.
Under Johnson, a debtor in the Eighth Circuit who fails to demonstrate a federal interest can expect only minimal extensions of
whatever redemption period is provided by state law. If the debtor is
unable to redeem within the statutory period, the filing of a bankruptcy petition will automatically protect the debtor's right to redeem for sixty days following the date of filing,174 pursuant to
section 108. Bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit will not extend
169. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests
by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty,
to discourage forum shopping and to prevent a party from receiving 'a
windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.'
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
170. See MINN. STAT. §§ 583.01-.12.
171. A farmer may petition the court to postpone a foreclosure sale of his or her
farm for up to 12 months. Id. § 583.04. The farmer's statutory redemption period is
correspondingly reduced, except that the statutory redemption period cannot be less
than 30 days. Id. § 583.07. The major relief provided by the moratorium is, therefore, that the farmer is able to forestall the actual sale for up to 12 months and extend the total redemption period, equitable and statutory, by 30 days. Amundson &
Rotman, supra note 11, at 827-28. Forestalling the sale lengthens the period during
which the farmer can redeem the mortgage by merely paying the arrearage, vis-a-vis
the total outstanding debt, and is therefore more significant than the 30-day extension of the statutory redemption period. Id.; see also supra note 48 (discussion of equitable and statutory redemption).
172. See supra note 11.
173. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 53; notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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the redemption period further under section 362(a) and, absent a
federal interest, they will not extend it further under section 105.
A farmer should be able to obtain a stay of the redemption period
under section 105 by demonstrating a federal interest. Both the equitable treatment of creditors and the preservation of assets are important federal interests inherent in the Bankruptcy Code. These
interests were present in Johnson, but the court failed to recognize or
address either one.175
When faced with these federal interests in the future, courts
should grant a stay of the redemption period under section 105. A
temporary stay would give the bankrupt farmer a chance to develop a
reorganization plan which would preserve the farm for productive
use and provide for repayment of debts to all creditors. The court
could limit the stay to appropriately balance the farmer's interest in
preserving his or her equity and the foreclosing mortgagee's interest
in securing repayment. These remedies would be consistent with
Butner and Johnson and would further the federal interests espoused
in the Bankruptcy Code.
175. The court's failure to perceive these federal interests may be partly due to
the debtor's failure to sufficiently raise them on appeal. The debtor's discussion of
federal interests on appeal to the Eighth Circuit was not forceful. See generally Brief
for Appellee at 28-29.
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